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Employment Security: A Comparative Institutional
Debate
Kenneth G. Dau-Schnidt*
The debate at this Symposium concerning what legal doctrine should
govern questions of employment security mirrors the larger academic de-
bate on this subject in its diversity of opinions and arguments.' Supporters
and detractors of the employment-at-will doctrine have presented arguments
concerning the number of unjust discharges,2 the preferences of employers
and employees with respect to job security,3 the relative bargaining power
and information available to employers and employees,4 the effect of the
employment-at-will doctrine on the enforcement of other statutes such as
Title VII,' the efficacy of collateral torts in wrongful discharge litigation,6
employer opportunism over the employee life-cycle,7 and the external costs
of discharges in violation of public policy.8
* Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington, on leave from the University of Wisconsin.
B.A. 1978, University of Wisconsin; M.A., J.D. 1981, Ph.D. (Economics) 1984, University of
Michigan. I would like to thank Sam Issacharoff, Jack Getman, and the editors of the Texas Law
Review for inviting me to participate in the Symposium and write this comment. I would also like to
thank the other participants in the Symposium for the knowledgeable and stimulating discussion that
inspired these comments.
1. A nonexhaustive bibliography of the larger academic debate includes: PAUL C. WEILER,
GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990); Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); Andrew P. Morriss,
Exploding Myths:An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of EmploymentAt-Will, 59 Mo.
L. REV. 679 (1994); Cornelius I. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in
the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge
Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICE. L. REV. 8 (1993); Clyde W. Summers,
Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); and
J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the
Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 837.
2. Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful
Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1905-14 (1996).
3. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 841-43.
4. Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1792-95 (1996).
5. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1655, 1678-82 (1996).
6. Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful
Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (1996).
7. Morriss, supra note 2, at 1919; Schwab, supra note 1, at 39, 38-51; Verkerke, supra note 1,
at 861-63. For the theory of opportunistic use of the life-cycle, see infra note 19.
8. Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEx.
L. REV. 1943 (1996).
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Although the arguments put forth in this Symposium and in the larger
academic debate are diverse, I maintain that they all really address one
question of comparative institutional analysis:9 Which institution-
individual bargaining, collective bargaining, the courts, or legislative and
administrative regulation-can most efficiently accommodate employers'
and employees' preferences concerning employment security? As formu-
lated in this Symposium, the debate over this question has focused primar-
ily on the possible failures of individual bargaining to accommodate these
divergent preferences and only secondarily on the possible deficiencies of
the alternative institutions-these later deficiencies being raised largely as
a rear-guard action by the defenders of individual bargaining.1" This
focus on individual bargaining and its possible virtues and failures seems
appropriate given that, despite a growing list of common-law and statutory
exceptions to the notion of freedom of contract in employment law,
individual bargaining remains by far the dominant institution for
determining employment security rights in this country.1  Under
comparative institutional analysis, however, one must examine the
advantages and disadvantages of each alternative institution for resolving
the conflict over employment security before one can make public policy
recommendations.'" I will return to this question of the possible
advantages and disadvantages of the alternative institutions put forth in the
employment security debate toward the end of this comment. 13
Morriss and Verkerke are right to extol the virtues of individual
bargaining.' 4 When it works, it provides individualized solutions to
problems by balancing the divergent preferences of the affected parties
9. For the definitive treatise on comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONs IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1994).
10. See, e.g., Morriss, supra note 2, at 1933-36 (arguing that the regulation of labor markets
through institutions would be ineffectual or counterproductive). Professors Estlund and Issacharoff also
explicitly discuss the efficacy of other institutions in dealing with the problem of employment security.
See infra notes 22-24, 45-47 and accompanying text.
11. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Meeting theDemands of Workers into the Twenty-First Century: The
Future ofLabor and Employment Law, 68 IND. L.J. 685, 691 (1993) (stating that individual bargaining
dominates collective bargaining and regulation in the resolution of employer and employee conflict over
the terms of employment); see also Terry A. O'Neil, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate
Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 691 (1993) (stating that the unions' ability to negotiate
protective contracts is "useless to most employees because over eighty percent of the workforce is
nonunion").
12. See KOMESAR, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that "the correct question" is the comparative ability
of institutions to deal with a specific issue).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
14. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1923 ("[D]ifferent employees have different preferences about
job security. Legal rules which apply one-size-fits-all standards of job security will inevitably
disadvantage some employees."); Verkerke, supra note 1,-at 843 (arguing that empirical data under-
mine claims of market failure in the employment contract context).
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according to their willingness to pay.t" On the problem of employment
security, absent some failure of the bargaining process, employees could
use individual bargaining to obtain all the contractual employment security
they desire as long as the costs of those contractual protections to the
employer are less than the benefits of those terms to the employees. If
employees did not contract for employment security of some type, it would
be because the cost to the employer of such assurances outweighed their
benefits to the employees and the employees decided they would rather do
without the security and take their portion of the savings in higher wages
and benefits. 6
Unfortunately, participants in this Symposium have identified a
number of plausible ways in which individual bargaining may fail to
accommodate adequately the countervailing costs and benefits of employ-
ment security. Schwab and Estlund argue that individual bargaining fails
to account for all the costs of employer discretion in firing because
sometimes discharges impose costs on parties other than those engaged in
the negotiations."i Schwab persuasively offers this externalization-of-costs
argument as a rationale for the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy.'8 Schwab has also argued elsewhere that, because of
transaction costs in negotiations and enforcement, individual bargaining
fails to specify long-term implicit contracts that would provide the
employee with protection from opportunistic discharge by the employer
over the employee's life-cycle.' 9 Schwab enjoys some success in linking
15. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (4th ed. 1992) ("By a process of
voluntary exchange, resources are shifted to those uses in which the value to the customer, as measured
by willingness to pay, is highest.").
16. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1902-03 ("[T]he default nature of the at-will rle allows the
heterogeneous class of employees to choose among a diverse set of job characteristics when making
employment decisions.").
17. See Estlund, supra note 5, at 1664-65 (arguing that the wrongful discharge antidiscrimination
and antiretaliatory doctrines protect the public as a whole by promoting the equality of citizens and
providing incentives for employees to disclose illegal conduct); Schwab, supra note 8, at 1951-52
(noting that at-will employment does not adequately deter employers from requiring that their employ-
ees engage in activities like lying under oath, serving drinks to the drunk, or refusing jury duty).
18. Schwab, supra note 8, at 1950-52. For cases examining the public policy wrongful discharge
tort, see, for example, White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1421 (10th Cir. 1990)
(ordering a jury instruction that would allow the plaintiff to recover in his wrongful discharge suit if
it was found that the termination was "significantly motivated by the [plaintiffs] refusal to commit
perjury" because of the strong public interest in truthful testimony); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516
(Or. 1975) (holding that the tort of wrongful discharge for violation of public policy could be asserted
by an employee who alleged that she was fired for performing jury duty because of the important
community interest in the jury system).
19. Schwab, supra note 1, at 52-54. Under the life-cycle theory, workers are paid less than their
productivity justifies early in their tenure with the firm, and more than their productivity justifies late
in their tenure. Id. at 14-15. This practice allows employees to invest in job-specific human capital
and prevents shirking because employees will not want to be discharged before they obtain the high
wages of their late tenure. Id. at 17. Unfortunately, this life-cycle of wages and productivity gives
1996] 1647
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his economic arguments with the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing,20 although Verkerke challenges his reading of the cases. 1
Issacharoff accepts Schwab's life-cycle arguments, and also argues that
employees suffer in individual bargaining from an asymmetry of infor-
mation and bargaining power between employees and employers. '  On
the basis of the asymmetries in individual bargaining, Issacharoff argues
for "information-forcing" defaults in employment contract law that would
effectively require employers to raise the question of employment security
in individual negotiations and make clear the conditions under which
employees could be discharged.' 3 On the basis of Schwab's life-cycle
analysis, Issacharoff argues for a European-style severance scheme in
which, after two years of employment, a discharged employee is presump-
tively entitled to one month's severance pay for every year of service,
unless the employer can establish that the discharge was for cause.24
The Symposium participants discussed additional arguments that other
authors have raised concerning the failure of individual bargaining in the
negotiation of efficient employment security provisions.' For example,
some scholars argue that employees systematically underestimate the
employers an incentive to act opportunistically by firing employees before they receive their late tenure
payoff. Id. at 19. It is also possible for an employer to act opportunistically with respect to employees
early in their job tenure by, for example, firing a salesperson after she makes a sale but before she re-
ceives her commission.
20. See Schwab, supra note 1, at 32-51 (arguing that the pattern of court protection of employees
mimics the life-cycle theory, protecting workers at the beginning and the end of their careers when they
are most vulnerable to employers). For an example of the application of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context, see Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (finding that an employer who fired an employee in order to avoid having
to pay him a large commission violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
21. See Verkerke, supra note 1, at 863, 848-63 ("[Schwab's] life-cycle just cause hypothesis is
far less consistent with the pattern of employment contract decisions than an alternative hypothesis of
systematic jurisdictional variation.").
22. In terms far too romantic for the dismal science of economics, Issacharoff likens the bargaining
relationship between an employer and an employee to courtship "between a polygamist and a
monogamist." Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1795. To formalize his analogy for my fellow economic
nerds, I understand Issacharoff to be making two arguments. First, employers will be unable to iden-
tify perfectly the productivity of potential employees, and employees will be hesitant to request employ-
ment security in individual bargaining because this may falsely signal that they will be bad workers.
See David I. Levine, Just-Cause Employment Policies in the Presence of Worker Adverse Selection, 9
J. LAB. EcoN. 294, 295 (1991). Second, employers have more bargaining power than employees in
individual bargaining because they deal with many employees, few of whom are individually of vital
importance to the enterprise, while the employee deals with only one employer who provides the
employee's means of sustenance. It should be noted that information asymmetry may also prevent
employers from initially offering employment security provisions for fear of attracting only bad
employees. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 902-03.
23. Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1794-96.
24. Id. at 1806-07.
25. For a good summary of these arguments and an intelligent rebuttal, see Verkerke, supra note
1, at 898-912; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 11, at 688-92 (assessing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of individual bargaining as a method of obtaining employment security).
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benefits of employment security provisions because they underestimate the
probability and costs of discharge.26 Similarly, employers may systemati-
cally overestimate the costs of unjust discharge suits based on contractual
protections." If employees systematically underestimate the benefits of
employment security while employers systematically overestimate its cost,
the parties will negotiate too little employment security through individual
bargaining. Finally, it has been argued that, because working under a
contract with just-cause discharge provisions requires a costly managerial
system for documenting employee performance, employment security is a
public good in the workplace and employees will bargain for too little of
that good in individual negotiations.' These arguments, along with
Issacharoff's arguments above concerning asymmetries in information and
bargaining power, suppose a more pervasive failure in individual
bargaining than the third-party-cost and life-cycle arguments proposed by
Schwab and Estlund, and thus could be used to justify a more extensive
intervention on the province of individual bargaining by the courts or the
legislature.29
In my mind there is no doubt that individual bargaining does, at least
in some ways, fail to efficiently accommodate employers' and employees'
conflicting preferences with respect to employment security. Schwab and
26. Under established theories on the resolution of cognitive dissonance, "people prefer not to
think about unpleasant possibilities." Verkerke, supra note 1, at 898. Also, according to prospect
theory, people tend to underestimate the expected losses from relatively remote, low-probability events.
See Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 464, 465 (Daniel Kahmeman et al. eds., 1982) (arguing that
people underestimate the risk of rare events unless they are publicized); Daniel Kalmeman & Amos
Tversky, Subjective Probability:A Judgment ofRepresentativeness, 3 COGNITIVEPSYCHOL. 430 (1972)
(exploring the factors that influence people's subjective assessments of risk). If workers tend not to
think about the unfortunate circumstance of discharge and also tend to underestimate the probability of
that event, then it stands to reason that they would tend to underestimate the probable costs of
discharge.
27. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of the Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 47, 64 (1992).
28. Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (1984). Verkerke's
data seem to support the hypothesis that the standard of discharge is a public good because most
employers have all their employees on the same standard of discharge. See Verkerke, supra note 1,
at 866. A "public good" is a good or benefit that exhibits the characteristic that if one person obtains
it, others cannot be excluded from its enjoyment. For example, if it is efficient for employers to
operate under only one standard of discharge for their employees, then if one employee negotiates a
just-cause standard of discharge, all employees will enjoy the benefits of that standard. Employees will
individually bargain for too little of public goods because in their individual negotiations they will tend
not to ask for such goods with the hope that another employee will negotiate such a term from which
they can all benefit. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 646-52 (1991)
(discussing the concept of public goods and contending that private provisions of public goods may be
lower than the socially optimal level).
29. If defects in individual bargaining produce employment security contract terms that differ sig-
nificantly from what the efficient terms would be, then one could argue that the judicial or legislative
imposition of the efficient employment security terms would increase wealth.
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Estlund have made compelling and largely noncontroversial arguments
concerning the externalization of costs in employers' decisions to fire
employees for refusing to break the law, fulfilling a public obligation
(including "whistleblowing"), or exercising a statutory right.30  Schwab's
arguments concerning employers' opportunistic behavior associated with
the life-cycle also seem well founded, although Verkerke has convinced me
that Schwab's normative arguments for common-law regulation of this
behavior are well ahead of his positive arguments that such regulation is in
fact taking place. 31  Verkerke presents empirical evidence that the life-
cycle problems raised by Schwab are not reflected in the employment
contracts actually negotiated by employers and employees, and argues on
this basis that opportunistic firings late in the life-cycle are not a substantial
concern of employees. 32  Although Verkerke's survey of actual employ-
ment contracts is very useful and long overdue, his argument against
Schwab's life-cycle analysis assumes that current employment contracts
accurately and efficiently reflect employee preferences. Given the
empirical evidence on the divergence of productivity and pay over the life-
cycle 33 and the position of the life-cycle theory in labor economics at one
30. As Professor Estlund points out, even such an advocate of the free market as Judge Posner
has recognized a common-law exception to employment at will to protect employees in exercising a
legal right. Estlund, supra note 5, at 1663 & n.31; see also POSNER, supra note 15, at 330. The only
instance among these examples that Professor Schwab wrestles with in his public good/externalization-
of-costs model is the discharge of an employee for exercising a statutory right with no obvious public
benefit (filing for workers' compensation, for example). Schwab, supra note 8, at 1954-55. In that
case, there are no costs from the decision that are obviously external to the parties. Id. However, I
suspect that in many cases the original rationale for creating the employee's statutory right will also
provide a rationale for prohibiting the effective waiver of that right in any case in which the employee
would not exercise the statutory right for fear of losing his job. For example, assume the rationale for
workers' compensation is that individual employees underestimate the risk and costs of injury and thus
do not ask for appropriate compensating wages, and that the tort system is a less efficient institution
than workers' compensation for resolving injury disputes; this rationale would support the required
payment of compensation, even in cases in which the employee would not file if he could lose his job
for such filing, in order to adequately and efficiently compensate workers for their injuries and provide
employers incentive to make the workplace safe.
31. There are, of course, cases prohibiting various types of employer opportunistic behavior on
the grounds that it violates an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, e.g., Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256-58 (Mass. 1977), but Verkerke persuasively argues that
the common-law understanding of opportunism is not yet tied to years of service under the life-cycle
model. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 848-62; see also Harris v. Arkansas Book Co., 700 S.W.2d 41
(Ark. 1985) (allowing arbitrary discharge of an employee of 49 years without severance pay or a
pension).
32. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 879-82.
33. See JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE AND EARNINGS 120 (1974) (concluding that
because "earnings are a return on cumulated net investments, they also rise at a diminishing rate over
the working life, and decline when net investment becomes negative, as in old age"); JACOB MINCER,
JOB TRAINING: COSTS, RETURNS, AND WAGE PROFILES 7 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 3208, 1989) (finding that "wage growth decelerates with age because training does,
and that no other variable appears to affect individual wage growth"); James N. Brown, Why Do Wages
Increase With Tenure? On-the-Job Training and Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed Within Firms, 79
1650
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geological stratum above bedrock,'M the absence of sufficient provisions
against opportunism in actual employment contracts is more a reflection on
the failure of individual bargaining than on the failure of the life-cycle
hypothesis.35 Moreover, if one accepts Priest's strong theory on the
efficient evolution of the common law,36 then the very emergence in the
common law of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing suggests that these
doctrines are responding to some inadequacy in individual bargaining.
I am also persuaded that there is probably a more pervasive failure in
individual bargaining to reflect adequately employee preferences on the
subject of employment security, although I think it is too early to say
whether this is due to the public-good nature of managerial systems,
asymmetries in information and bargaining power, systematically inaccurate
estimates of benefits and costs, or some combination of these three
explanations. The principal evidence that I would cite in support of this
assertion is the prevalence of just-cause provisions in collective bargaining
agreements.37 If workers do not desire job security, why do they
negotiate for it collectively? Morriss cites the General Social Survey'
AM. ECON. REV. 971, 971 (1989) (explaining the divergence of pay and productivity as "deriving from
optimal investments that diminish gradually over the life-cycle"); James L. Medoff & Catherine G.
Abraham, Experience, Performance, and Earnings, 95 Q.J. ECON. 703, 730 (1980) (finding that the
earnings of older managerial employees do not correlate with productivity).
34. See generally SOLOMON W. POLACHECK & W. STANLEY SIEBERT, THE ECONOMICS OF
EARNING 15, 1-34 (1993) (remarking that the life-cycle model "forms a core of human capital theory
which deals with the acquisitions of earnings power so crucial to understanding earnings differences").
35. Indeed, proponents of the life-cycle theory maintain that the long-term contract governing the
parties' relationship will be implicit and so will not be reflected in explicit employment contracts such
as those in Verkerke's study. See Donald 0. Parsons, The Employment Relationship: Job Attachment,
Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 790, 799 (Orley C.
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986) (explaining that "[p]rivate agreements of implicit contracts
that are not enforceable in the courts may... be attractive and, depending on circumstances, more or
less efficient"); Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of
Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 261 (1975) (noting that many essential details of a job
are not easily identified or described and must therefore be left implicit in the employment contract).
36. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD., 65, 72 (1977) (arguing that legal rules inevitably become efficient over time). I refer
to this as the "strong theory" on the efficient evolution of the common law to distinguish it from
Rubin's theory which requires that both parties to a conflict be repeat players for the common law to
evolve toward efficiency. See Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
51, 61 (1977). Because employees are not usually repeat players in employment security cases, one
must subscribe to Priest's analysis, which requires only that transaction costs be positive for efficient
evolution to take place, see Priest, supra, at 65, in order for my argument in the text to follow.
37. Ninety percent of all collective bargaining agreements include some form of employment
security, with "just cause" being by far the dominant standard for discharge. 40 Collective Bargaining
Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 63 (1979).
38. JAMES A. DAVIS & TOM W. SMITH, GENERAL SOCIAL SURvEYS, 1972-1991: CUMULATIVE
CODEBOOK230-31 (1991) (reporting the results of a study that shows job security ranks fourth among
five job characteristics, but that union members rank job security more highly than nonmembers).
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and argues that although union members may value job security, most em-
ployees do not value it highly.39 Verkerke distinguishes the nonunion and
union sectors, arguing that collective agreements cater to average rather
than marginal workers, that the existence of a union makes it cheaper to
enforce employment security provisions, and that workers sort into the
nonunion and union sectors according to their preferences for job security
according to the Tiebout effect.' However, neither of these lines of
attack explains to my satisfaction why employees who have recently
organized, and so who have not had time to sort according to their
preferences, commonly negotiate just-cause protection in their collective
agreements. If it is due to the differences between the preferences of
(younger) marginal workers and (older) average workers or to the effi-
ciencies of union arbitration, why doesn't individual bargaining regularly
produce modest administrative protections for senior workers? I believe
the answer lies in the theories of individual bargaining failure discussed
above.
The question that has received far less attention in this Symposium,
and in the larger academic debate, is how well the alternative institutions
of collective bargaining, the common law, and legislation will fare in
efficiently accommodating employer and employee preferences with respect
to employment security. As previously mentioned, a complete comparative
institutional analysis of the question not only will assess the deficiencies of
individual bargaining in the employment security context, but also will
assess the relative deficiencies of the alternative institutions.4 Morriss
has done the most to address this question, rightly arguing that imposition
of a mandatory just-cause standard on all employment relationships, either
by common-law rule or by legislation, will provide an inefficient solution
for those employees who prefer higher wages to greater job security.42
Morriss also argues that a just-cause standard will be costly because
employers will be confined to using only verifiable information in making
discharge decisions, in case they are challenged in court.43 Estlund
39. Morriss, supra note 2, at 1922-24.
40. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 890-94. In the labor economics literature there is a distinction
drawn between "marginal," generally younger workers, who have attractive job alternatives and
.average," generally older workers, who do not have attractive job alternatives. Predictably, marginal
workers are less concerned with job security than average workers because of their better job
alternatives. See RiCHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 9-10 (1984);
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of AmericanLaborLaw andthe SearchforBargaining
Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 438 n.63 (1992) (both arguing that unions give
more weight to the interests of average workers, as reflected by negotiations for pension provisions and
just-cause clauses).
41. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
42. See Morriss, supra note 2, at 1902-03.
43. Id. at 1934.
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responds that the current at-will regime undermines the enforcement of
statutory protections against discriminatory discharge such as Title VII, 44
because the burden is on employees to show that they were discharged for
reasons that violated the statute rather than for "any" or "no" reason as
allowed under the at-will doctrine.4' A mandatory just-cause standard
will, she argues, improve the operation of our other statutory protections
by putting the burden on employers to show legitimate reasons why the
employee was discharged.' Finally, Issacharoff touts the administrative
efficiency of his proposed information-forcing standards and European-style
severance rules as a major reason for adopting his proposal.47
In my view, more work needs to be done on the efficacy of these
alternative institutions in addressing the problem of employment security.
My own impression is that the current common-law exceptions of the pub-
lic policy wrongful discharge tort and the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing constitute fairly narrow incursions on the institution of
individual bargaining that add little to the overall cost of managing
employees and provide important protections against the most egregious
employer acts. Imposition of a common-law or statutory mandatory just-
cause standard for employment contracts would constitute a broader
incursion, which should be undertaken only after careful study of the
Montana and Puerto Rico experiments" and foreign administrative
schemes such as those championed by Professor Issacharoff. Among the
questions to examine in studying these experiments are the effects of the
mandatory rule or administrative scheme on wages, shirking, the number
of discharges, the type of discharges, the cost of managing employees, and
the cost of administration. In closing, let me say that one of the unfor-
tunate aspects of the decline of the labor movement in this country has
been that this institution, which has proven itself so adept at addressing the
employment security problem, is no longer a realistic alternative for many
workers.49 The absence of a discussion at this Symposium of the insti-
tution of collective bargaining as a means of solving employee job security
problems is indicative of the institution's current decline.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994) (making illegal discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in the employment context).
45. Estlund, supra note 5, at 1671-72; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp.' v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973) ("The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute
of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.").
46. Estlund, supra note 5, at 1682-86.
47. See Issacharoff, supra note 4, at 1794-96, 1811.
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1994) (requiring that employees that have com-
pleted their employer's probationary period of employment be discharged only for "good cause"); P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1985 & Supp. 1991) (granting employees discharged "without good cause"
an indemnity, to be paid by their former employer, equal to one month's salary plus one week's pay
for each year of employment).
49. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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